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Abstract
In this paper, equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers in a constant
retrial queue with multiple vacations and the N -policy under two information levels, respectively, are
investigated. We assume that there is no waiting area in front of the server and an arriving customer
is served immediately if the server is idle; otherwise (the server is either busy or on a vacation) it
has to leave the system to join a virtual retrial orbit waiting for retrials according to the FCFS rules.
After a service completion, if the system is not empty, the server becomes idle, available for serving
the next customer, either a new arrival or a retried customer from the virtual retrial orbit; otherwise
(if the system is empty), the server starts a vacation. Upon the completion of a vacation, the server
is reactivated only if it finds at least N customers in the virtual orbit; otherwise, the server continues
another vacation. We study this model at two levels of information, respectively. For each level
of information, we obtain both equilibrium and optimal balking strategies of customers, and make
corresponding numerical comparisons. Through Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm, we
explore the impact of parameters on the equilibrium and social optimal thresholds, and obtain the
trend in changes, as a function of system parameters, for the optimal social welfare, which provides
guiding significance for social planners. Finally, by comparing the social welfare under two information
levels, we find that whether the system information should be disclosed to customers depends on how
to maintain the growth of social welfare.
Keywords: Multiple vacations, Equilibrium strategies, Balking strategies, Particle Swarm Opti-
mization algorithm, Information accuracy
1 Introduction
In many service and electronic commerce systems, there exists a new trend to study the behavior of
customers in queuing models. In these models, customers can decide whether to join or balk, according
to a natural tendency to maximize their personal utility. To this end, from the perspective of game-
theory, the decentralized behavior of customers in the queuing system has attracted extensive attentions
in recent decades. Generally, queuing systems are divided into the observable case and the unobservable
case depending on whether customers can obtain the information about the system upon arrival. The
observable case was first studied by Naor [16], who analyzed an M/M/1 queue model with a linear
reward-cost structure, and obtained equilibrium and social optimal strategies. Subsequently, Naor’s study
was extensively extended, see e.g. [6,11,18]. Specifically, Edelson and Hilderbrand [6] complemented the
unobservable case to Naor’s model. Chen and Frank [2] generalized the model of Naor’s, who assumed that
customers and servers use the same discount rate to maximize their expected discount utility. Afterward,
some authors studied equilibrium strategies in various invisible models with many different characteristics.
The monograph of Hassin and Haviv [10] summarized the main results of the subject under different levels
of information.
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The present paper aims to discuss equilibrium strategies and socially optimal balking strategies of
customers in an M/M/1 constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and the N -policy. Customers’
retrials are a common phenomenon in service systems and enterprise engineering. For example, arriving
calls to a call center will be connected immediately if service staff is available, otherwise customers may
have to retry for service after a random time. With the development of information technology, modern
call centers may provide some levels of information to callers, e.g., the current number of customers
waiting for service and/or expected waiting time, among other possibilities. Server vacation is another
useful concept in modeling for situations, in which optimization of resources and/or reduction of cost
are/is required. For vacation models, due to technical and cost (or other) reasons, the server might
not be able to obtain the information about the current system capacity during the vacation, or it
is impossible for the server to immediately return to work when the number of customers reaches a
predetermined threshold, or the number of customers in the system is small at the end of the server
vacation so that the server is reluctant to return to work, or return to work at the normal service rate.
In addition, too frequent startups and changeovers on operations could lead to severe server wear and
overhead on cost, the N -policy is usually used to solve this predicament, such as batch traffic transfer
systems, controlled manufacturing systems and possible others. In the literature, there are relatively
fewer papers studying queueing models with N -policy from the perspective of economic. Therefore, a
model combining customer retrials, server multiple vacations, and the N -policy is of practical interest
and is our focus of this paper.
As for studies on equilibrium balking strategies of customers, Burnetas and Economou [1] considered
queueing models with setup times under several information levels; Economou and Kanta [4] discussed
balking strategies for an observable queue with breakdowns and repairs; Liu, Ma and Li [14] explored an
observable queue under single vacation policy; Ma, Liu and Li [15] presented equilibrium balking behavior
under a multiple vacation policy; Sun, Li and Cheng-Guo [19] investigated equilibrium strategies and
optimal balking strategies for an unobservable queue with double adaptive working vacations. Customers’
equilibrium strategies for queue systems with retrials were also reported in the literature, for example,
[12,23] when balking is not allowed, and [5,13,21] when balking is allowed. Regarding models implemented
with the N -policy, Guo and Hassin [7,8] investigated models at two information levels with homogeneous
and heterogeneous customers, respectively; Guo and Li [9] addressed the same issue for systems, which
are partially observable, such as the system capacity is observable, or the state of system is observable.
Wang, Zhang and Huang [22] presented customers’ strategic behavior and the social optimal problem in
a constant retrial queue with the N -policy. Sun, Li and Tian [20] discussed equilibrium strategies and
balking strategies with multiple vacations and the N -policy.
However, different from the previously mentioned literature on the N -policy, the present paper
assumes that the system can be reactivated if and only if, upon the completion of a vacation, the server
finds at least N customers in the virtual orbit; otherwise, the server continues another vacation.
This paper studies equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers in a queue
with a constant retrial rate, multiple server vacations, and the N -policy under two information levels
(the observable case and the unobservable case). In this system, there is no waiting area in front of
the server and an arriving customer will be serviced immediately if the state of server is idle; otherwise
(when the state of the server is busy or on vacation, it has to leave the system to join a virtual retrial
orbit waiting for retries according to the FCFS rule. After the completion of each service, the server
will take a vacation if the system is empty, or becomes idle if there is at least one customer in the orbit.
The idle server will serve the next customer, either a new arrival or a retried customer, whichever comes
earlier. The server be reactivated, upon return from the vacation, if at least N customers are presented
in the virtual orbit; otherwise, the server will start another vacation. For each type of information
level, we determine equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers and social welfare.
For the observable case, in order to ensure that the server can be reactivated, we derive the optimal
balking threshold of customers in the vacation state, which must be greater than the optimal threshold
in busy state, and also greater than N − 1. Therefore, there are three different queuing cases for the
observable case, and we study the corresponding stationary distributions for the three queuing cases, and
obtain the equilibrium social welfare per time unit. For the unobservable case, we derive the positive
equilibrium arrival rate and optimal arrival rate, which are both unique. However, due to the complexity
of equations involved, explicit expressions for the equilibrium balking thresholds of customers, socially
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optimal balking thresholds and optimal social welfare are not available in general. Hence, we use the
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm to solve the complex analytic characteristics, by which
the numerical optimal solution (n∗(1), n∗(2)), and optimal social welfare Us(n∗(0), n∗(1)) and Us(λ
∗
) are
obtained. By comparing the numerical results for the two different information levels, respectively, we
conclude that the customers’ equilibrium behavior makes the system more congested than that under the
socially optimal strategy, and whether the system information should be disclosed to customers depends
on how to maintain the growth of the social welfare (i.e., potential demand arrivals). Obviously, in
order to maximize the social welfare, which factor determines the level of information disclosure and
when to disclose system information to customers are also crucial for the server or social planner. To
conclude our main contributions made in this paper, we emphasize that to our best knowledge, a model,
which combines features of retrials, multiple vacations, and the N -policy, has not been considered in the
literature for the purpose of customers’ equilibrium, and optimal balking strategies.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model in detail. We
derive the corresponding stationary distributions for the three queueing cases, equilibrium thresholds and
social benefit per time unit in Section 3. Section 4 contributes to studies for the unobservable case, and
we derive the equilibrium arrival rate and optimal arrival rate. Section 5 focuses on using numerical
analysis to explore the theoretical findings in the previous sections, and compare the observable and
unobservable cases of this model. Section 6 presents discussions and possible further studies.
2 Model description
Consider a single-server retrial queueing system with a constant retrial rate, multiple server vacations,
and the exhaustive N -policy. We assume that customers arrive to the system according to a Poisson
process with rate λ, served by a single server with exponential service rate µ. There is no waiting area
in front of the server. An arriving customer will be serviced immediately if the server is idle and leave
the system immediately upon the completion of the service; otherwise (the server is either busy or on a
vacation), it will join a virtual retrial orbit according to the first-come, first-served discipline (FCFS). In
practice, a customer in the orbit can be viewed as a customer on the waiting list. After the completion of
a service, the server becomes idle and immediately searches for the customer from the top of the waiting
list. The time of the search is a random variable, exponentially distributed with rate θ. In the search
process, if a new customer arrives, the search will be immediately interrupted and the server will return
to serving the arriving customer; otherwise (no arrivals during the search process), the customer at the
head of the waiting line will be served and will leave the system upon the completion of its service. After
all customers in the system are served, or when the system becomes empty, the server will take a vacation
of exponential amount of time V with rate ξ. During the vacation time, the server will be not available
to serve customers. Upon the completion of a vacation, the server will continue to another (independent)
vacation with the same parameter if there are fewer than N customers in the system; otherwise, the
server will return from vacations (to idle state) and immediately start the same search process as that
for the case, described above, when the server becomes idle from busy. This type of queue systems is
referred to as the M/M/1/MV queue. Inter-arrival times of customers, service times and the times of
retrials are assumed to be mutually independent.
The state of the system at time t can be represented by a random vector {(M(t), I(t))}, where I(t)
denotes the number of customers in the orbit, and M(t) denotes the state of the server at time t:
M(t) =

0, on vacation;
1, busy;
2, idle.
Obviously, the stochastic process {(M(t), I(t))} is a continuous-time Markov chain. The corresponding
transition rate diagram is shown in Fig. 1. Moreover, the observable case means that arriving customers
can observe all information about M(t) and I(t), and the unobservable case implies that arriving cus-
tomers can not observe any information about M(t) and I(t).
The study of strategic customer behavior is important. In our case, we are interested in deciding
whether an arriving customers would join or balk the system. Suppose that every customer receives the
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Fig. 1: Transition rate diagram of original model.
same reward of R units for completing its service, which is used to quantify customer satisfaction or the
added value of service. In addition, there is a waiting cost of C units per time unit. The total waiting
time for a customer is the continuous accumulation of the time when the customer reaches the system and
until he leaves the system (including the service time). Customers are risk neutral and want to maximize
their expected net benefit. Specifically, if a customer receives the reward of service is more than the
expected waiting cost, then he will join the system. If a customer receives the reward of service equal to
the expected waiting cost, the customer will be indifferent between joining and balking. Therefore, we
only need to consider the reward with satisfying the following inequality:
R >
C
µ
. (1)
The above constrain assures that all customers, who find server being idle, always enter the system since
his reward R is more than the waiting cost during his expected service time (1/µ). We adopt a natural
linear reward-cost structure, and U is defined as the expected net benefit after the service completion,
i.e., U = R − CE[W ], where E[W ] is mean sojourn time of the customer. Obviously, if the customer is
balking, it will generate U = 0.
Under both levels of information levels, under the condition in (1), customers will be sure to enter
the system if they find that the state of the system is idle upon arrivals. However, if an arriving customer
finds a vacation or busy state, he has to decide whether to leave his contact details (enter retrial orbit) or
leave for ever. We further assume that the arriving customers know the policy of the system, i.e., their
decisions are irrevocable: the balking customers cannot retry and customers, who joined the system,
cannot renege.
3 The observable case
As mentioned above, the observable case means that arriving customers can observe all information about
M(t) and I(t). Obviously, the information about I(t) (orbit length) is useful when the arriving customer
finds the server being busy or on the vacation, but it is useless when the customer finds the server being
idle upon arrivals, since in this case the customer will be served immediately regardless of the orbit length.
Therefore, in all cases, the information about the system (both M(t) and I(t)) is valuable for the arriving
customer to make a better assessment on whether or not he should join the system. More specifically, if
M(t) is idle, the customer will join the system for sure regardless of I(t); if M(t) is busy or on vacation,
according to the FCFS discipline, the arriving customer knows his position in the orbit, which can help
him in deciding whether entering the system is preferable. In the observable case, define W (i, n) to
be the sojourn time of the marked customer, who joins the system at state (i, n − 1) (i = 1, 2, 3). For
studying optimal balking strategies, we need to consider the expected (residual) net benefit of the marked
customer, who is at the nth position in the orbit and the state of the server is i, after he receives the
service. We denote the equilibrium balking threshold of customers and the integrated strategy at sate i
by ne(i) and (ne(0), ne(1)), respectively. In addition, we denote the socially optimal balking threshold of
customers and the integrated strategy at state i by n∗(i) and (n∗(0), n∗(1)), respectively. To characterize
ne(0) and ne(1), we first give the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1 For the M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and N -policy, when
a marked customer is at nth position in the orbit and the state of server is i (i = 0, 1, 2), the mean
(residual) sojourn time T (i, n) of the marked customer are given by, respectively,
T (0, n) =
1
ξ
+ n · λ+ θ + µ
µθ
, n ≥ N. (2)
T (1, n) = n · λ+ θ + µ
µθ
+
1
µ
, n = 0, 1 . . . . (3)
T (2, n) = n · λ+ θ + µ
µθ
, n = 1, 2 . . . . (4)
Proof. Consider a marked customer arrived to the system, who found that the server is busy or on
vacation. Clearly, the mean overall sojourn time of the marked customer is not affected by customers
who arrive after the marked customer by finding the server being busy or on vacation, but it is affected
by the customers, who enter the system after the marked customer by finding the server being idle, since
in this case, by our imposed condition (1)) they will join the system to receive the service immediately.
Since T (1, 0) represents the mean residual service time of the customer, who is receiving the service,
we have
T (1, 0) =
1
µ
. (5)
For n ≥ 1, let m(n) be the probability of joining the virtual orbit for the arriving customer, who finds
the server being busy and n customers being in the orbit. Then, based on a first step argument and
noticing that the mean time to the next event is 1/(λm(n) + µ), and the next event is an arrival or a
service completion with probability λm(n)/(λm(n) + µ) or µ/(λm(n) + µ), respectively, we have
T (1, n) =
1
λm(n) + µ
+
λm(n)
λm(n) + µ
T (1, n) +
µ
λm(n) + µ
T (2, n), n = 1, 2, . . . . (6)
When the server state is idle, we can similarly get
T (2, n) =
1
λ+ θ
+
λ
λ+ θ
T (1, n) +
θ
λ+ θ
T (1, n− 1), n = 1, 2 . . . . (7)
For i = 0, we only need expressions for n ≥ N (see Remark 3.1), which is given by
T (0, n) =
1
ξ
+ T (2, n). (8)
In terms of (7) and by solving (6) for T (1, n), we get
T (1, n) =
λ+ θ + µ
µθ
+ T (1, n− 1), n = 1, 2 . . . , (9)
which leads to (3). Substituting (3) into (7) produces (4). Finally, substituting (4) into (8) gives (2),
which completes the proof.
Remark 3.1 In the above theorem, we did not provide the expression for T (0, n) when n < N , since for
our purpose, we only need the expression when the server can be reactivated, or n ≥ N .
3.1 Equilibrium
We first study the equilibrium balking behavior of customers in the observable case, i.e., the customers
can observe both information of M(t) and I(t) at time t. As mentioned above, the condition (1) ensures
that the customers who find the server is idle always enter the system. The customers who find a vacation
or busy state have to decide whether to leave their contact details (enter retrial orbit) or leave for ever.
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Fig. 2: Transition rate diagram of (M(t),I(t)) for the observable queues when N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1).
Therefore, we only need to consider that the system is in the state of vacation or busy upon the customers
arrivals.
From Theorem 3.1, it is easy to know that the sojourn time W (0, n) of the marked customer satisfies
the following equation when he encounters the system state (0, n):
E[W (0, n)] = T (0, n) =
1
ξ
+ n · λ+ θ + µ
µθ
, n ≥ N. (10)
Define Ue(0, n) = R−CE[W (0, n)] to be the corresponding residual net benefit of the marked customer,
and solve Ue(0, n) = 0 to get the equilibrium balking threshold:
ne(0) =
⌊
µθ
λ+ θ + µ
(
R
C
− 1
ξ
)
⌋
, (11)
where the floor function bxc is the largest integer smaller than x.
Similarly, when the server state is i = 1, we have
E[W (1, n)] = T (1, n) =
1
µ
+ n · λ+ θ + µ
µθ
, n = 0, 1 . . . . (12)
Define Ue(1, n) = R − CE[W (1, n)] to be the corresponding the residual net benefit of the marking
customer, and slove Ue(1, n) = 0 to get the balking threshold:
ne(1) =
⌊
µθ
λ+ θ + µ
(
R
C
− 1
µ
)
⌋
. (13)
Obviously, there are two possibilities: (i) µ > ξ, which implies ne(1) > ne(0); and (ii) ξ > µ, which
implies ne(0) > ne(1). Hence, we need to discuss the stationary distribution of the system in three cases:
Case 1: N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1); Case 2: N − 1 ≤ n(1) ≤ n(0); and Case 3: n(1) < N − 1 ≤ n(0) for the
unobservable case. Our focus in this section is to characterize the integrated balking threshold strategy
(n(0), n(1)) for these three cases.
Case 1: For N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1), the corresponding transition rate diagram is showed in Fig. 2,
and the state space of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by:
Ωeob1 = {(0, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1} ∪ {(1, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1} ∪ {(2, n) : 1 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1}. (14)
Define the stationary distribution as
pii,n = P{M = i, I = n} = lim
t→∞P{M(t) = i, I(t) = n}, (i, n) ∈ Ω
e
ob1, i = 0, 1, 2.
The stationary distribution for this case (Caese 1) is given in Theorem 3.2.
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Theorem 3.2 For the fully observable M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and
the N -policy, if N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1), then the state space Ωeob1 of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by (14), and
the stationary distribution {pii,n |(i, n) ∈ Ωeob1 } is given by:
pi0,n =

µ
λ · pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
· pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0);
µ
ξ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0, n = n(0) + 1;
(15)
pi1,n =

A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
B1 +B2 · Fn +D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(0);
B1 +B2 · Fn(0)+1 +D1 ·
(
λ−Fξ
λ+ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−1
− (1 + ξθ ) ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0, n = n(0) + 1;
B1 +B2 · Fn(0)+2 +D1 ·
(
λ−Fξ−F 2ξ
λ+ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−1
− λ+θ+ξ+Fθ+Fξθ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0, n = n(0) + 2;
E2 · Fn, n(0) + 3 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1;
(16)
and
pi2,n =

µ
λ+θ · pi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n + λλ+ξ · pi0,n, N ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1;
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n, n(0) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1;
(17)
where {
A1 =
µF
λ(1−F ) · pi1,0,
A2 =
(
1 + µFλ(F−1)
)
· pi1,0,
(18)
 B1 = A1 −D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)N−1
· λ(1−F )−Fξ(1−F )(λ+ξ) ,
B2 = A2 −D1 ·
(
λ
F (λ+ξ)
)N−1
· ξ(1−F )(λ+ξ) ,
(19)
F =
λ(λ+ θ)
θµ
, (20)
D1 =
ξµ(λ+ ξ + θ)(λ+ ξ)
N−1 · pi1,0
λN−1
(
(λ(λ+ θ) + θµ)− λθµ− (λ+ θ)(λ+ ξ)2
) , (21)
and
E2 =
pi1,n(0)+2
Fn(0)+2
, (22)
pi1,0 can be obtained by the normalization condition
∑
(i,n)∈Ωeob1
pii,n = 1.
Proof. From Fig. 2, the corresponding balance equations of the stationary distribution are given as
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follows,
λpi0,0 = µpi1,0, (23)
λpi0,n = λpi0,n−1, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (24)
(λ+ ξ)pi0,n = λpi0,n−1, N ≤ n ≤ n(0), (25)
ξpi0,n(0)+1 = λpi0,n(0), (26)
(λ+ µ)pi1,0 = θpi2,1, (27)
(λ+ µ)pi1,n = λpi1,n−1 + λpi2,n + θpi2,n+1, 1 ≤ n ≤ n(1), (28)
µpi1,n(1)+1 = λpi1,n(1) + λpi2,n(1)+1, (29)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 and n(0) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1, (30)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n + ξpi0,n, N ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1. (31)
We first consider the stationary distribution {pi0,n |0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1}. From (23) and (24), we can obtain
pi0,n =
µ
λ
pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. (32)
From (25) and (32),
pi0,n =
λ
λ+ξpi0,n−1 =
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
pi0,N−1
=
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
µ
λpi1,0
= µλ
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0).
(33)
Based on (26) and (33), we can get
pi0,n(0)+1 =
λ
ξ
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−N+1
µ
λ
pi1,0 =
µ
ξ
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−N+1
pi1,0. (34)
Therefore, we can get (15) from the above discussion.
Next, we consider the stationary distribution {pi1,n |0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1}. From (28) and (30), we can
obtain
(λ+ µ)pi1,n = λpi1,n−1 +
λµ
λ+ θ
pi1,n +
θµ
λ+ θ
pi1,n+1, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. (35)
The solution of (35) can be given by the following homogeneous linear difference equation:
θµ
λ+ θ
xn+1 −
(
λ+
θµ
λ+ θ
)
xn + λxn−1 = 0, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. (36)
The characteristic equation corresponding to (36) is
θµ
λ+ θ
x2 −
(
λ+
θµ
λ+ θ
)
x+ λ = 0, (37)
which has two roots: 1 and F = λ(λ+θ)θµ . Let x
h
n = A1 + A2F
n be the general solution of (36), where A1
and A2 are the coefficients that need to be determined. From (27) and (30), we can obtain{
A1 +A2 = pi1,0,
(λ+ µ)(A1 +A2) = θpi2,1 =
θµ
λ+θpi1,1 =
θµ
λ+θ (A1 +A2F ),
(38)
which yields {
A1 =
µF
λ(1−F )pi1,0,
A2 =
(
1 + µFλ(F−1)
)
pi1,0.
(39)
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Therefore,
pi1,n = A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (40)
where A1 and A2 are given by (39).
Now, let us continue to consider the stationary distribution {pi1,n |N ≤ n ≤ n(0)}. From (28) and
(31), we can obtain
θµ
λ+ θ
pi1,n+1 −
(
λ+
θµ
λ+ θ
)
pi1,n + λpi1,n−1
= −
(
1 +
θ
λ+ ξ
)
ξµ
λ+ θ
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N+1
pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0). (41)
The solutions of (41) can be obtained through solving the following system of nonhomogeneous linear
difference equations:
θµ
λ+ θ
xn+1 −
(
λ+
θµ
λ+ θ
)
xn + λxn−1 = −
(
1 +
θ
λ+ ξ
)
ξµ
λ+ θ
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N+1
pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0),
(42)
whose corresponding characteristic equation is given by
θµ
λ+ θ
x2 −
(
λ+
θµ
λ+ θ
)
x+ λ = −
(
1 +
θ
λ+ ξ
)
ξµ
λ+ θ
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N+1
pi1,0. (43)
Define ygn = y
h
n + y
s
n as the general solution of (43), where y
h
n is the general solution of the homogeneous
version of (43), which is yhn = B1 +B2F
n, and ysn is a specific solution of (43).
We consider a specific solution ysn = D1
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n
of (43). Substituting it into (43), we can obtain
D1 =
ξµ(λ+ ξ + θ)(λ+ ξ)
N−1 · pi1,0
λN−1
(
(λ(λ+ θ) + θµ)− λθµ− (λ+ θ)(λ+ ξ)2
) . (44)
Thus,
ygn = B1 +B2F
n +D1
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(0), (45)
where B1 and B2 are the coefficients that need to be determined. By considering (40), we get B1 = A1 −D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)N−1
· λ(1−F )−Fξ(1−F )(λ+ξ) ,
B2 = A2 −D1 ·
(
λ
F (λ+ξ)
)N−1
· ξ(1−F )(λ+ξ) .
(46)
Therefore,
pi1,n = B1 +B2 · Fn +D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(0), (47)
where D1, B1 and B2 are given by (44) and (46), respectively. Specially, based on (28), (31), (15) and
(47), we can obtain the stationary distribution of {pi1,n(0)+1} as follows:
pi1,n(0)+1 = B1 +B2 ·Fn(0)+1 +D1 ·
(
λ− Fξ
λ+ ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−1
− (1 + ξ
θ
) ·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−N+1
·pi1,0. (48)
Based on (28), (30), (31), (15) and (48), we can get the stationary distribution of {pi1,n(0)+2} as follows:
pi1,n(0)+2 = B1 +B2 · Fn(0)+2 +D1 ·
(
λ− Fξ − F 2ξ
λ+ ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−1
−λ+ θ + ξ + Fθ + Fξ
θ
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0.
(49)
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Fig. 3: Transition rate diagram of (M(t),I(t)) for the observable queues when N − 1 ≤ n(1) ≤ n(0).
Continue our proof for the case of {pi1,n |n(0) + 3 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1}. In this case, the general solution
of (36) is zhn = E1 +E2F
n, where E1 and E2 are the coefficients that need to be determined. From (29),
(30) and (49), we can obtain E1 = 0 and
E2 =
pi1,n(0)+2
Fn(0)+2
. (50)
Therefore,
pi1,n = E2 · Fn, n(0) + 3 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1, (51)
which leads to (16).
Finally, we consider the stationary distribution of {pi2,n |1 ≤ n ≤ n(1) + 1}. From (16), (30) and
(31), we can easily get (17).
In summary, (15), (16) and (17) are all related to pi0,1, and we can get pi0,1 by normalizing conditions∑
(i,n)∈Ωeob1
pii,n = 1.
Based on Fig. 2 and Theorem 3.2, we know that the balking states of customers are (0, n(0) + 1)
and (1, n(1) + 1). For the social optimization, which will be considered later, we define Ueob1(n(0), n(1))
to be the social benefit per time unit in Case 1: N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1), or
Ueob1(n(0), n(1)) = λR(1− pi0,n(0)+1 − pi1,n(1)+1)− C(
n(0)+1∑
n=0
npi0,n+
n(1)+1∑
n=0
npi1,n +
n(1)+1∑
n=1
npi2,n). (52)
Indeed, the first summand of (52) is the effective arrival rate at the system times the reward R, while
the second summand is the mean number of customers in the system. Obviously, the equilibrium social
benefit is Ueob1(ne(0), ne(1)).
Case 2: For N − 1 ≤ n(1) ≤ n(0), the corresponding transition rate diagram is showed in Fig. 3,
and the state space of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by
Ωeob2 = {(0, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1} ∪ {(1, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1} ∪ {(2, n) : 1 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1}. (53)
The stationary distribution for this case (Caese 2) is given in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3 For the fully observable M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and
the N -policy, if N − 1 ≤ n(1) ≤ n(0), then the state space Ωeob2 of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by (53), and
the stationary distribution {pii,n |(i, n) ∈ Ωeob2 } is given by:
pi0,n =

µ
λ · pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
· pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0);
µ
ξ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0, n = n(0) + 1;
(54)
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pi1,n =

A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
B1 +B2 · Fn +D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(1);
B1 +B2 · Fn(1)+1 +D1 ·
(
λ− Fξ
λ+ ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−1
−( ξ
λ+ ξ
+
ξ
θ
) ·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−N+1
· pi1,0,
n = n(1) + 1;
(1− F )B1 +D1
(
λ
λ+ξ − F
)(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(1)−1
+ ψ(n) · pi1,0, n(1) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(0)
pi1,n(0) −
(
1 + ξθ
)(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
pi1,0, , n = n(0) + 1;
(55)
and
pi2,n =
{
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n + ξλ+ξ · pi0,n, N ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1;
(56)
where Ai (i = 1, 2), Bi (i = 1, 2), F and D1 are given by (18), (19), (20) and (21), respectively.
ψ(n) =
(
λ
λ+ ξ
+
λ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N
−
(
1 +
λ+ ξ
θ
+
ξ
λ
+
ξ(λ+ ξ)
λ+ θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)+2−N
. (57)
pi1,0 can be obtained by the normalization condition
∑
(i,n)∈Ωeob2
pii,n = 1.
Proof From Fig. 3, the corresponding balance equations of the stationary distribution are given as
follows:
λpi0,0 = µpi1,0, (58)
λpi0,n = λpi0,n−1, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (59)
(λ+ ξ)pi0,n = λpi0,n−1, N ≤ n ≤ n(0), (60)
ξpi0,n(0)+1 = λpi0,n(0), (61)
(λ+ µ)pi1,0 = θpi2,1, (62)
(λ+ µ)pi1,n = λpi1,n−1 + λpi2,n + θpi2,n+1, 1 ≤ n ≤ n(1), (63)
µpi1,n(1)+1 = λpi1,n(1) + λpi2,n(1)+1 + θpi2,n(1)+2, (64)
µpi1,n = λpi2,n + θpi2,n+1, n(1) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(0), (65)
µpi1,n(0)+1 = λpi2,n(0)+1, (66)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (67)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n + ξpi0,n, N ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1. (68)
We first consider the stationary distribution {pi0,n |0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1}. From (58)–(61), the discussion
is similar to the discussion for (23)–(26), which leads to (54).
We next consider the stationary distribution {pi1,n |0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1}. From (62), (63) and (67), the
discussion is similar to that for (40), and we can obtain
pi1,n = A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (69)
where A1 and A2 are given by (39).
We now continue to consider the stationary distribution {pi1,n |N ≤ n ≤ n(1)}. From (54), (63) and
(68), the discussion is similar to that for (47), and we can obtain
pi1,n = B1 +B2 · Fn +D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(1), (70)
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where D1, B1 and B2 are given by (44) and (46), respectively. Specially, based on (54), (63) and (70),
we can get the stationary distribution of {pi1,n(1)+1} as follows:
pi1,n(1)+1 = B1+B2 ·Fn(1)+1+D1 ·
(
λ− Fξ
λ+ ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−1
−( ξ
λ+ ξ
+
ξ
θ
)·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−N+1
·pi1,0. (71)
Based on (54), (64), (68) and (71), we can get the stationary distribution of {pi1,n(1)+2} as follows
pi1,n(1)+2 = (1− F )B1 +D1
(
λ
λ+ ξ
− F
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−1
−
(
ξ
λ
+
ξ(λ+ ξ)
λ+ θ
+
ξ
λ+ ξ
+
ξ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−N+2
pi1,0.
(72)
Continue further to consider the stationary distribution of {pi1,n |n(1) + 3 ≤ n ≤ n(0)}. Based on
(54), (65) and (68), we can obtain that
pi1,n − pi1,n−1 = −
(
ξ
λ+ ξ
+
ξ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N
pi1,0. (73)
Recursively using (73), we can obtain that
pi1,n =
(
λ
λ+ ξ
+
λ
θ
)((
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N
−
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)+2−N)
+ pi1,n(1)+2, n(1) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(0). (74)
Thus,
pi1,n = (1− F )B1 +D1
(
λ
λ+ ξ
− F
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−1
+ ψ(n)pi1,0, n(1) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(0), (75)
where
ψ(n) =
(
λ
λ+ ξ
+
λ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N
−
(
1 +
λ+ ξ
θ
+
ξ
λ
+
ξ(λ+ ξ)
λ+ θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)+2−N
. (76)
Specially, based on (54), (65) and (68), we can get the stationary distribution of {pi1,n(0)+1} as follows:
pi1,n(0)+1 = pi1,n(0) −
(
1 +
ξ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(0)−N+1
pi1,0. (77)
Therefore, taking into account all the above discussions, we can get (55).
Finally, we consider the stationary distribution of {pi2,n |1 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1}. From (55), (67) and
(68), We can easily get (56).
In summary, (54), (55) and (56) are all related to pi0,1, and we can get pi0,1 by normalizing conditions∑
(i,n)∈Ωeob2
pii,n = 1.
Based on Fig 3 and Theorem 3.3, we know that the states at which customers will balk are (0, n(0)+1)
and (1, n(1) + 1). Denote Ueob2(n(0), n(1)) to be the social benefit per time unit in Case 2, or N − 1 ≤
n(1) ≤ n(0). Then,
Ueob2(n(0), n(1)) = λR(1− pi0,n(0)+1 −
n(0)+1∑
n=n(1)+1
pi1,n)
−C(
n(0)+1∑
n=0
npi0,n +
n(1)+1∑
n=0
npi1,n +
n(0)+1∑
n=1
npi2,n).
(78)
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Fig. 4: Transition rate diagram of (M(t),I(t)) for the observable queues when n(1) < N − 1 ≤ n(0).
Obviously, the equilibrium social benefit is Ueob2(ne(0), ne(1)).
Case 3: For n(1) < N − 1 ≤ n(0), the corresponding transition rate diagram is showed in Fig. 4,
and the state space of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by:
Ωeob3 = {(0, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1} ∪ {(1, n) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1} ∪ {(2, n) : 1 ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1}. (79)
The stationary distribution for this case (Caese 3) is given in Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.4 For the fully observable M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and
the N -policy, if n(1) < N − 1 ≤ n(0), then the state space Ωeob3 of {(M(t), I(t))} is given by (79), and
the stationary distribution {pii,n |(i, n) ∈ Ωeob3 } is given by:
pi0,n =

µ
λ · pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n−N+1
· pi1,0, N ≤ n ≤ n(0);
µ
ξ ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
· pi1,0, n = n(0) + 1;
(80)
pi1,n =

A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
B1 +B2 · Fn +D1 ·
(
λ
λ+ξ
)n
, N ≤ n ≤ n(1);
B1 +B2 · Fn(1)+1 +D1 ·
(
λ− Fξ
λ+ ξ
)
·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−1
−( ξ
λ+ ξ
+
ξ
θ
) ·
(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)−N+1
· pi1,0,
n = n(1) + 1;
(1− F )B1 +D1
(
λ
λ+ξ − F
)(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(1)−1
+ ψ(n) · pi1,0, n(1) + 2 ≤ n ≤ n(0)
pi1,n(0) −
(
1 + ξθ
)(
λ
λ+ξ
)n(0)−N+1
pi1,0, n = n(0) + 1;
(81)
and
pi2,n =
{
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ+θ · pi1,n + ξλ+ξ · pi0,n, N ≤ n ≤ n(0) + 1;
(82)
where Ai (i = 1, 2), Bi (i = 1, 2), F and D1 are given by (18), (19), (20) and (21), respectively,
ψ(n) =
(
λ
λ+ ξ
+
λ
θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n−N
−
(
1 +
λ+ ξ
θ
+
ξ
λ
+
ξ(λ+ ξ)
λ+ θ
)(
λ
λ+ ξ
)n(1)+2−N
. (83)
pi1,0 can be obtained by the normalization condition
∑
(i,n)∈Ωeob3
pii,n = 1.
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Fig. 5: Transition rate diagram for the unobservable case.
From Fig. 4, we know that Case 3 and Case 2 have the same equilibrium equations. Hence, the
stationary distribution of Case 3 is the same as that of Case 2, and therefore we omit the proof of Theorem
3.4. Based on Fig 4 and Theorem 3.4, we can obtain that the states, at which customers will balk are
(0, n(0) + 1) and (1, n(1) + 1). Denote the social benefit per time unit in Case 3 by Ueob3(n(0), n(1)). We
then have
Ueob3(n(0), n(1)) = λR(1−pi0,n(0)+1−
n(0)+1∑
n=n(1)+1
pi1,n)−C(
n(0)+1∑
n=0
npi0,n +
n(1)+1∑
n=0
npi1,n +
n(0)+1∑
n=1
npi2,n). (84)
Obviously, the equilibrium social benefit is Ueob3(ne(0), ne(1)).
3.2 Social optimization
Summarize the above discussion, we define Us(n(0), n(1)) as the social benefit per time unit, thus
Us(n(0), n(1)) =

Ueob1(n(0), n(1)) if N − 1 ≤ n(0) ≤ n(1);
Ueob2(n(0), n(1)) if N − 1 ≤ n(1) ≤ n(0);
Ueob3(n(0), n(1)) if n(1) < N − 1 ≤ n(0).
(85)
We define Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) as the socially optimal social welfare. Obviously, it’s easy for us to get
Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) = max{Us(n(0), n(1))}.
4 The unobservable case
In the observable case, we assume that the arriving customers can observe all information about M(t)
and I(t). Now, in the unobservable case, we assume that the arriving customers cannot observe any
information about M(t) or I(t). In this case, the customers join the system with probability q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1).
So, the effective arrival rate is λ = λq, the equilibrium mixed strategy of the customers is denoted by
the equilibrium arrival rate λe = λqe (qe is equilibrium joining probability of the customers), and the
socially optimal mixed strategy is denoted by the optimal arrival rate λ
∗
= λq∗, where q∗ is optimal
joining probability of the customers. The corresponding transition rate diagram is showed in Fig. 5.
4.1 Equilibrium
In the unobservable case, the arriving customers can neither observe the state of the server M(t) nor the
number of other customers I(t) in the orbit. In order to obtain the equilibrium arrival rate λe in this
case, the stationary distribution needs to be determined first. From Fig. 5, it is easy to know that the
process {M(t), I(t)} is a quasi-birth-and-death (QBD) process with
Ωun = {(0, n) : n ≥ 0} ∪ {(1, n) : n ≥ 0} ∪ {(2, n) : n ≥ 1}.
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If ρ = λ/µ < 1, (M, I) is defined as the stationary limit of the process {M(t), I(t)}. The stationary
distribution is denoted by:
pi = (pi0,0, pi1,0, pi1, pi2, . . . , pin, . . .),
where
pin = (pi0,n, pi1,n, pi2,n), n ≥ 1,
with the definition of
pii,n = P {M = i, I = n} = lim
t→∞P {M(t) = i, I(t) = n} , (i, n) ∈ Ωun for i = 0, 1, 2.
Let Q be defined as the infinitesimal generator of the process. Then, the stationary probability vector pi
can be solved through the equations piQ = 0:
λpi0,0 = µpi1,0; (86)
λpi0,n = λpi0,n−1, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1; (87)
(λ+ ξ)pi0,n = λpi0,n−1, n ≥ N ; (88)
(λ+ µ)pi1,0 = θpi2,1; (89)
(λ+ µ)pi1,n = λpi1,n−1 + λpi2,n + θpi2,n+1, n ≥ 1; (90)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1; (91)
(λ+ θ)pi2,n = ξpi0,n + µpi1,n, n ≥ N. (92)
From Fig. 5 and ordering the states in the state space Ωun lexicographically, we can write the infinite
generator for the Markov process {(M(t), I(t))} as a block-partitioned form as follows:
Q =

A0,0 A0,1
A1,0 A1 A0
A2 A1 A0
A2 A1 A0
. . .
. . .
. . .
A2 A1 A0
A2 B1 A0
A2 B1 A0
. . .
. . .
. . .

, (93)
where
A0,0 =
( −λ 0
µ −(λ+ µ)
)
, A0,1 =
(
λ 0 0
0 λ 0
)
, A1,0 =
 0 00 0
0 θ
 ,
A0 =
 λ 0 00 λ 0
0 0 0
 , A1 =
 −λ¯ 0 00 −(λ¯+ µ) µ
0 λ¯ −(λ¯+ θ)
 , A2 =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 θ 0
 ,
B1 =
 −(λ¯+ ξ) 0 ξ0 −(λ¯+ µ) µ
0 λ¯ −(λ¯+ θ)
 .
Theorem 4.1 For the unobservable case, the M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations
and the N -policy, given the arrival rate λ, the stationary distribution {pii,n |(i, n) ∈ Ωun } is given by
pi0,n =

µ
λ¯
pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ¯+ξ
pi1,0, n = N ;
r11pi0,N , n ≥ N ;
(94)
15
pi1,n =

A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
ρ(λ+θ)
θ (A1 +A2 · F
N−1
) + λ(λ+θ)
θ(λ+ξ)
pi1,0 +
λξ
θ(λ+ξ)
pi1,0, n = N ;
r12pi0,N + r22pi1,N , n ≥ N ;
(95)
and
pi2,n =

µ
λ¯+θ
pi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
ξ
λ¯+θ
pi0,N +
µ
λ¯+θ
pi1,N , n = N ;
r13pi0,N + r23pi1,N , n ≥ N ;
(96)
where F = λ(λ+θ)θµ ,  A1 =
µF
λ(1−F )pi1,0;
A2 = (1 +
µF
λ(F−1) )pi1,0;
(97)

r11 =
(
λ¯
λ¯+ξ
)n
;
r12 =
λ¯
(
λ¯(λ¯+θ)
θµ
)n−N
(λ¯+θ+ξ)
λ¯θ+λ¯2−θµ+θξ+λ¯ξ −
(
λ¯
λ¯+ξ
)n−N
(λ¯2+λ¯θ+λ¯ξ)
λ¯θ+λ¯2−θµ+θξ+λ¯ξ ;
r13 =
λ¯
(
λ¯(λ¯+θ)
θµ
)n−N
µ(λ¯+θ+ξ)
(λ¯+θ)(λ¯θ+λ¯2−θµ+θξ+λ¯ξ) −
(
λ¯
λ¯+ξ
)n−N
(λ¯µ−λ¯ξ+µξ−ξ2)
λ¯θ+λ¯2−θµ+θξ+λ¯ξ ;
r22 =
(
λ¯(λ¯+θ)
θµ
)n−N
;
r23 =
µ
(
λ¯(λ¯+θ)
θµ
)n−N
λ¯+θ
;
(98)
and
pi1,0 =
λξ(θµ− λ2 − λθ)
µ2(λ+ θ)(λ+Nξ)
. (99)
Proof In order to obtain the stationary distribution of the system, we first need to obtain the rate
matrix R, which is the minimum non-negative solution of the following matrix quadratic equation:
R2A2 +RB1 +A0 = 0. (100)
By detailed calculations, we get the minimum non-negative solution of R as follows:
R =
 λλ¯+ξ
λ¯2(λ¯+θ+ξ)
θµ(λ¯+ξ)
λ¯
θ
0 λ¯(λ¯+θ)θµ
λ¯
θ
0 0 0
 . (101)
Using the matrix-geometric solution (see [17]), we have:
pin = piNR
n−N , n ≥ N, (102)
and (pi0,0, pi1,0, pi1, pi2 . . . piN−1, piN ) satisfies the following equation:
(pi0,0, pi1,0, pi1, pi2 . . . piN−1, piN )B[R] = 0, (103)
where
B[R] =

A0,0 A0,1
A1,0 A1 A0
A2 A1 A0
A2 A1 A0
. . .
. . .
. . .
A2 A1 A0
A2 RA2 +B1

. (104)
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Substituting (104) into (103), we can get:
λpi0,0 = µpi1,0;
λ¯pi0,n = λ¯pi0,n−1; 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
(λ¯+ ξ)pi0,N = λ¯pi0,N−1;
(λ¯+ µ)pi1,0 = θpi2,1;
(λ¯+ µ)pi1,n = λ¯pi1,n−1 + λ¯pi2,n + θpi2,n+1, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µpi1,N = λ¯pi1,N−1 + λ¯pi0,N + λ¯pi2,N ;
(λ¯+ θ)pi2,n = µpi1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
(λ¯+ θ)pi2,N = ξpi0,N + µpi1,N .
(105)
By calculating (105), we can get
pi0,n =
{
µ
λ¯
pi1,0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
µ
λ¯+ξ
pi1,0, n = N ;
(106)
pi1,n =
{
A1 +A2 · Fn, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
ρ(λ+θ)
θ (A1 +A2 · F
N−1
) + λ(λ+θ)
θ(λ+ξ)
pi1,0 +
λξ
θ(λ+ξ)
pi1,0, n = N ;
(107)
and
pi2,n =
{
µ
λ¯+θ
pi1,n, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1;
ξ
λ¯+θ
pi0,N +
µ
λ¯+θ
pi1,N , n = N ;
(108)
where F = λ(λ+θ)θµ ,  A1 =
µF
λ(1−F )pi1,0,
A2 = (1 +
µF
λ(F−1) )pi1,0.
(109)
From (106)–(108), piN = (pi0,N , pi1N , pi2,N ) can be obtained. By (101), R
n−N can be obtained as
follows:
Rn−N =
 r11 r12 r130 r22 r23
0 0 0
 , (110)
where r11, r12, r13, r22 and r23 see (98). Now, from (102), we can get:
pi0,n = r11pi0,N , n ≥ N ;
pi1,n = r12pi0,N + r22pi1,N , n ≥ N ;
pi2,n = r13pi0,N + r23pi1,N , n ≥ N.
(111)
Hence, considering the above discussion, (94)–(96) can be obtained, and pi1,0 can be calculated by the
following normalization condition:
pi0,0 + pi1,0 +
N−1∑
n=1
pine+ piN (I −R)−1e = 1, (112)
where the expression for pi1,0 is given in (99).
In Theorem 4.1, the stationary distribution under unobservable case was obtained by using the
matric-analytic method, based on which we can get the mean queue length E[L(λ¯)] for the unobservable
case, given by:
E[L(λ¯)] =
∞∑
n=1
n(pi0,n + pi1,n + pi2,n)
=
λ¯
ξ
+
λ¯
θ(µ− λ¯) +
θξ
(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
+
θ(µ− ξ)
µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
+
N(N − 1)ξ
µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
. (113)
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By using Little’s law for the whole system, we can get mean sojourn time E[W (λ¯)]:
E[W (λ)] =
E[L(λ)]
λ
=
1
ξ
+
1
θ(µ− λ¯) +
θξ
λ¯(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
+
θ(µ− ξ)
λ¯µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
+
N(N − 1)ξ
λ¯µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
. (114)
We obtain the equilibrium arrival rate and socially optimal arrival rate by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 For the unobservable M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and the
N -policy, we have the following conclusions on the equilibrium arrival rate:
(i) It has no positive equilibrium arrival rate, if R < CE[W (λ¯)];
(ii) It has one positive equilibrium arrival rate λe = λ1 (if and only if λ1 ≤ λ), if R = CE[W (λ¯)], where
λ1 is the unique positive solution of E[W
′(λ)] = 0;
(iii)
λe

∈ {λ2, λ3}, if R > CE[W (λ1)] and λ3 ≤ λ;
∈ {λ2, λ}, if R > CE[W (λ1)] and λ2 < λ < λ3;
= λ, if R > CE[W (λ1)] and λ = λ2;
no positive rquilibrium rate, if R > CE[W (λ1)] and λ2 > λ;
(115)
where λ2, λ3 (with 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ3) are the positive solutions of R− CE[W (λ)] = 0.
Proof From (114), we can obtain the expected net benefit Ue(λ) of the marked customer:
Ue(λ) = R− CE[W (λ)]
= R− C
(
1
ξ
+
1
θ(µ− λ¯) +
θξ
λ¯(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
+
θ(µ− ξ)
λ¯µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
+
N(N − 1)ξ
λ¯µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
)
. (116)
Since the second-order derivative of E[W (λ)] in λ is given by:
E[W ′′(λ)] =
2
θ(µ− λ¯)3
+ 2θξ
(
1
λ¯3(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
+
1
λ¯(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
3
+
1
λ¯(λ¯+ θ)
2
(λ¯+ ξ)
2 +
1
λ¯(λ¯+ θ)
3
(λ¯+ ξ)
+
1
λ¯2(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
2 +
1
λ¯2(λ¯+ θ)
2
(λ¯+ ξ)
)
+ 2θ(µ− ξ)
(
1
λ¯µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
3 +
1
λ¯2µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
2 +
1
λ¯3µ3(λ¯+ ξ)
)
+ 2N(N − 1)ξ
(
1
λ¯µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
+
1
λ¯2µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
2 +
1
λ¯3µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
)
. (117)
If ρ = λµ < 1, then E[W
′′(λ)] is positive. In this case, E[W (λ)] is strictly convex of λ. If we denote the
positive solution of equation E[W ′(λ)] = 0 by λ1, and the positive solutions of Ue(λ) = R−CE[W (λ)] = 0
by λ2 and λ3 (0 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ3), then we have the following results:
(1) When R < CE[W (λ1)], i.e., Ue(λ1) < 0, Ue(λ) is negative for every λ. Therefore, it has no
positive equilibrium arrival rate, which leads to (i).
(2) When R = CE[W (λ1)], i.e., Ue(λ1) = 0, Ue(λ) is negative for every λ 6= λ1. Therefor, it has one
positive equilibrium arrival rate λe = λ1 (if and only if λ1 ≤ λ), which leads to (ii).
(3) When R > CE[W (λ1)], i.e., Ue(λ1) > 0. If λ3 ≤ λ, it has two positive equilibrium arrival rates
λe = {λ2, λ3}, which leads to the first part of (115). If λ2 < λ < λ3, it has two positive equilibrium
arrival rates λe = {λ2, λ}, which leads to the second part of (115). If λ = λ2, it has a unique positive
equilibrium arrival rate λe = λ2, which leads to the third part of (115). If λ2 > λ, obviously, it has no
positive equilibrium arrival rate, which leads to the fourth part of (115).
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4.2 Social optimization
In this section, we discuss the optimal balking behavior of customers in the unobservable case in terms
of the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.3 For the unobservable M/M/1/MV constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and the
N -policy, the socially optimal mixed strategy is given by
λ
∗
=
{
λ
∗
1, if λ
∗
1 ≤ λ;
λ, if λ
∗
1 > λ;
(118)
where λ
∗
1 (λ
∗
1 > 0) is the solution of US
′(λ) = 0, and Us(λ) = λR− CE[L(λ)].
Proof From (113), we can get the social welfare per time unite Us(λ) as follows:
Us(λ) = λR− CE[L(λ)]
= λR− C
(
λ¯
ξ
+
λ¯
θ(µ− λ¯) +
θξ
(λ¯+ θ)(λ¯+ ξ)
+
θ(µ− ξ)
µ2(λ¯+ ξ)
+
N(N − 1)ξ
µ2(λ¯+Nξ)
)
. (119)
The second-order derivative of Us(λ) in λ is given by:
Us
′′(λ) = − 2C
θ(µ− λ)2
− 2Cλ
θ(µ− λ)3
− 2Cθξ
(λ+ θ)(λ+ ξ)
3 −
2Cθξ
(λ+ θ)
2
(λ+ ξ)
2
− 2Cθξ
(λ+ θ)
3
(λ+ ξ)
− 2Cθ(µ− ξ)
µ2(λ+ ξ)
3 −
2CN(N − 1)ξ
µ2(λ+Nξ)
3 . (120)
If ρ = λµ < 1, then Us
′′(λ) < 0. So, Us(λ) is strictly concave of λ. If we denote the unique positive
solution of equation Us
′(λ) = 0 by λ
∗
1 (λ
∗
1 > 0), then we have the following results:
(1) When λ
∗
1 ≤ λ, obviously, the socially optimal mixed strategy λ
∗
of customers is unique, which is
λ
∗
1.
(2) When λ
∗
1 > λ, the socially optimal mixed strategy λ
∗
of customers is unique, which is λ.
5 Numerical results
In this section, we explore the previous theoretical results through numerical experiments. One should
note that, due to the complexity of equations (85) and (119), explicit expressions for the equilibrium
balking threshold ne(i), (i = 0, 1), of customers, the socially optimal balking threshold n
∗(i), (i = 0, 1),
and the optimal social welfare are not available in general. Hence, we use Particle Swarm Optimization
(PSO) algorithm to numerically solve complex analytic characteristics in this section. The numerical
optimal solution (n∗(1), n∗(2)) of max
(n(0),n(1))
Us(n(0), n(1)) and optimal social welfare Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) and
Us(λ
∗
) can be obtained by PSO algorithm. PSO algorithm was introduced by Kennedy and Eberhart [3]
to solve continuous nonlinear optimization problems, and it has been widely used to solve global optimal
solutions, since it does not require many constraints and objective functions. The key procedure of
applying PSO algorithm to find the optimal solution (searching for socially optimal balking threshold
n∗(i) (i = 0, 1)) is illustrated in Algorithm 1, where the velocity Vid and position Xid are generally
provided by:
Vid = ω ∗ Vid + c1 ∗ rand() ∗ (pBesti −Xid) + c2 ∗ rand() ∗ (gBesti −Xid), (121)
and
Xid = Xid + Vid, (122)
where i is the number of particles, d is the dimension, rand() is a random number in (0, 1), c1 and c2 are
the learning factor and ω is the inertia factor.
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Algorithm 1 Searching for socially optimal balking threshold n∗(0) and n∗(1)
Input: R, C, λ, µ, ξ, θ, N ;
Output: n∗(0) , n∗(1);
1: for each particle i
2: Initializing velocity Vid and position Xid for each particle i
3: Evaluating particle i and setting pBesti = Xid
4: end for
5: gBesti=min {pBesti}
6: while not stop
7: for i =1 to M
8: Updating the velocity and position of particle i
9: Evaluating particle i
10: if fit (Xid) < fit (pBesti)
11: pBesti = Xid
12: if fit (pBesti) < fit (gBesti)
13: gBesti = pBesti
14: end for
15: end while
16: print gBesti
17: end
5.1 Numerical results for the observable case
Based on a large number of numerical experiments with a series of parameter choices, we conclude that
key qualitative properties are independent of the choice of parameters. To illustrate these properties, we
present some exemplary results below. First, we explore the trend in changes for the socially optimal
thresholds (n∗(0), n∗(1)) with respect to N and ξ in Fig 6 and Fig 7, respectively. They illustrate the
following phenomena.
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Fig. 6: Socially optimal thresholds (n∗(0), n∗(1)) with respect to N when R = 15, C = 1, λ = 5, µ = 3,
ξ = 0.15, θ = 5.
1. From Fig. 6, we can observe that n∗(0) and n∗(1) increase with N , which illustrates that the
social planner wants customers to actively join the system with the growth of N .
2. In Fig. 6, it is clear n∗(0) ≤ n∗(1) when N ≤ 12, n∗(0) > n∗(1) when N > 12. The reason for this
is that Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) = Ueob1(n(0), n(1)) when N ≤ 12, and Us(n∗(0), n∗(1)) = Ueob3(n(0), n(1)) when
N > 12. Specially, n∗(0) = N − 1 when N > 7. It indicates that n∗(0) is the minimum threshold to
ensure server activity. Therefore, when the social planner sets a larger N value, the corresponding n∗(0)
will be generated.
20
3. From Fig. 7, we can observe that both n∗(0) and n∗(1) decrease with ξ, which illustrates that
customers’ selfishness does not match the wishes of the social planner. Specially, n∗(0) = N − 1 when
ξ > 1.5, which illustrates that the social planner does not want to accumulate many customers during
the vocation.
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Fig. 7: Socially optimal thresholds (n∗(0), n∗(1)) with respect to ξ when R = 15, C = 1, λ = 5, µ = 3,
θ = 5, N = 7.
Next, we explore the trend in changes for n∗(i) and ne(i) (i = 0, 1) with respect to θ and µ in Fig 8
and Fig 9, respectively. They reveal the following phenomena.
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Fig. 8: Equilibrium and socially optimal thresholds with respect to θ when λ = 3, µ = 5, R = 15,
C = 1, ξ = 0.2, N = 3.
1. From Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, we can observe that both n∗(i) and ne(i) (i = 0, 1) increase with respect
to θ and µ, respectively. It is obvious that the growth rate of ne(i) (i = 0, 1) is much faster than the
growth rate of n∗(i) (i = 0, 1).
2. ne(i) > n
∗(i) (i = 0, 1) always holds as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, which illustrates that the
customers’ individual behavior under the stable equilibrium can lead to system congestion more seriously.
Finally, Fig. 10 shows that the relationship between the optimal social welfare Us(n
∗(0), n ∗ (1))
and N , and the relationship between the optimal social welfare Us(n
∗(0), n ∗ (1)) and ξ. It reveals the
following phenomena.
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Fig. 9: Equilibrium and socially optimal thresholds with respect to µ when λ = 3, θ = 6, R = 23, C = 1,
ξ = 1, N = 12.
1. In Fig. 10 (a), the optimal social welfare Us(n
∗(0), n ∗ (1)) decreases with N . The reason is that
when N becomes larger, more customers will be accumulated, which leads to more waiting costs.
2. In Fig. 10 (b), the optimal social welfare Us(n
∗(0), n ∗ (1)) increases with ξ. When ξ becomes
bigger, it speeds up the operation of the system, which can then produce the social welfare more effectively.
Moreover, when ξ increases to a certain value, the social welfare reaches its maximum and remains stable
afterwards.
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Fig. 10: (a) Optimal social welfare with N when µ = 3, ξ = 0.1, θ = 5, R = 20, C = 1; (b) Optimal
social welfare with ξ when µ = 3, θ = 5, N = 6, R = 20, C = 1.
5.2 Numerical results for the unobservable case
In the unobservable case, λ2 is unstable from the equilibrium point of view. Thus, we only study the stable
one with λ1, λ3 or λ in the following numerical results. First, we explore the impact of the parameters
N , ξ, θ and µ on the equilibrium arrival rate λe = λqe and the optimal arrival rate λ
∗
= λq∗ in Fig. 11,
respectively. They illustrate the following phenomena.
1. From Fig. 11, we can always see that λe (i.e. λqe) ≥ λ∗ (i.e. λq∗) with N , ξ, θ and µ, respectively.
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Fig. 11: Equilibrium and optimal arrival rates with respect to N , ξ, θ and µ, respectively. (a) R = 10,
C = 1, λ = 3, µ = 3, ξ = 0.5, θ = 5; (b) R = 20, C = 1, λ = 5, µ = 5, θ = 3, N = 6 ; (c) R = 10, C = 1,
λ = 5, µ = 5, ξ = 3, N = 6; (d) R = 10, C = 1, λ = 3, ξ = 3, θ = 5, N = 3.
2. In Fig. 11 (a), λe (i.e. λqe) decreases with N , whereas λ
∗
(i.e. λq∗) increases with N . The reason
for this is that a larger value of N reduces the enthusiasm of customers to join the system. However, a
larger value of N makes the social planner encourages more customers to enter the system.
3. From Fig. 11 (b), (c) and (d), we can observe that the interests of customers and the social
planner are coincident with each other with respect to ξ, θ and µ. This is because that shortening the
vacation time can reduce waiting costs, and increasing the retrial rate and service rate can accelerate
switchover of the system back from vacations.
Moreover, Fig. 12 shows that λe (i.e. λqe) ≥ λ∗ (i.e. λq∗) as a function of λ. It is obvious that the
value of N has no significance on λe and λ
∗
when λ > λ1, but λ1 increases with N . Thus, a higher value
of N will scare away customers unless λ is big enough.
If all customers follow the stable equilibrium mixed strategy λe, then their equilibrium social welfare
per time unit Us(λe) can be achieved. Similarly, the optimal social welfare per time unit Us(λ
∗
) can also
be obtained. Fig. 13 shows the trend in changes for the optimal social welfare per time unit Us(λ
∗
) with
respect to N and ξ, respectively. Obviously, the case shown in Fig. 13 is similar to that shwon in Fig.
10.
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Fig. 12: Equilibrium and optimal arrival rates for unobservable case with R = 10, C = 1, µ = 3, ξ = 2,
θ = 5; (a) N = 3; (b) N = 25.
5.3 The role of the information level on the equilibrium social welfare and
optimal social welfare
An important issue in the strategic customer queuing model is the level of information that the social
planner should provide to customers. Fig. 14 explores the trend in changes for the equilibrium social
welfare of customers and optimal social welfare of customers under two levels of information. The
properties shown here are presentative since the conclusions made are based on comprehensive numerical
experiments with a broad choice of system parameters.
1. In Fig. 14 (a), it shows that the equilibrium strategy of customers is balking when λ is small,
since smaller λ does not intend to activate the system. In this case, both Us(ne(0), ne(1)) and Us(λe) (i.e.
Us(λqe)) have a zero-increase-decrease trend with λ. However, Us(λe) ≥ Us(ne(0), ne(1)) when λ < λe,
since the arrival rate is small and the number of people in the system is small. In this case, hiding
the system information from customers helps to increase the number of customers entering the system,
thereby increasing social welfare. Similarly, Us(λe) < Us(ne(0), ne(1)) when λ > λe, which shows that
disclosing the system information can help reduce the system congestion, thus reducing waiting costs.
2. In Fig. 14 (b), it shows that the socially optimal mixed strategy of customers is balking when
λ is small. Both Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) and Us(λ
∗
) (i.e. Us(λq
∗)) keep growth, Us(λ
∗
) eventually becomes a
constant. Similar to Fig. 14 (a), Fig. 14 (b) also shows that Us(λ
∗
) ≥ Us(n∗(0), n∗(1)) when λ < λ∗,
Us(λ
∗
) < Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) when λ > λ∗. This also shows that the information level of the system has a
serious impact on the social welfare. Therefore, the social planner should choose the strategy consistent
with the system designer to achieve social optimum.
6 Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we studied equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers in a constant
retrial queue with multiple vacations and the N -policy under two information levels (observable case
and unobservable case), respectively. For each type of information levels, we determined equilibrium
strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers, and the social welfare. For the observable case,
in order to ensure that the server can be reactivated, we obtained that the optimal balking threshold
of customers in the vacation state must be greater than the optimal threshold in busy state or greater
than N . Therefore, there are three different queuing cases for the observable case, and we obtained the
corresponding stationary distributions for the three queuing cases, and determined the equilibrium social
welfare per time unit. For the unobservable case, we obtained the positive equilibrium arrival rate and
optimal arrival rate, which are unique. In Section 5, we explored the previous theoretical results through
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Fig. 13: (a) Optimal social welfare with N when µ = 3, ξ = 0.1, θ = 5, R = 20, C = 1; (b) Optimal
social welfare with ξ when µ = 3, θ = 5, N = 6, R = 20, C = 1.
numerical experiments. However, due to the complexity of the involved equations, explicit expressions for
the equilibrium balking thresholds of customers, socially optimal balking thresholds and optimal social
welfare are not available in general. Hence, we use Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm to solve
the complex analytic characteristics. The numerical optimal solution (n∗(1), n∗(2)) and optimal social
welfare Us(n
∗(0), n∗(1)) and Us(λ
∗
) are obtained by PSO algorithm. By comparing the numerical results
of the two information levels, we obtained that the customers’ behavior under the stable equilibrium
makes the system more congested than that under the socially optimal one, and whether the system
information should be disclosed to customers depends on how to maintain the growth of the social
welfare (i.e., potential demand arrivals). Obviously, in order to maximize the social welfare, which factor
determines the level of information disclosure and when to disclose the system information to customers
are also crucial for the server or social planner. Fortunately, this paper achieved this goal. In the future,
it is necessary for us to consider the almost observable case of this model, i.e., the state of the server can
be observed, but the number of customers in the orbit cannot be observed.
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